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Risk plays a central role in decision mak-
ing. Accordingly, risk has been a popular
research topic for more than four decades.
Finding a generic definition of risk is hard,
since this term is used in many areas such
as economics, political science, management
science, and medical research. However, one
thing in common is that risk is always related
to both the negative outcomes and uncer-
tainty. In addition, we know that risk is
normally subjective and constructed by a
human’s perception process. But indeed how
do people perceive risks? Is there any model
capable of describing this procedure and pre-
dicting people’s perceived risk? In this article,
we focus on empirical studies of perceived
risk.
In operations research/management sci-
ence as well as in psychological research,
much effort has been spent on defining the
subjective perception of risk. The central
topic is how we can define or predict peo-
ple’s perceived risk of a risky option based on
the characteristics of that option. The basic
structure has been simply depicted in Fig. 1
below.
In Fig. 1, vector C represents an option’s
characteristics related to its perceived risk.
The characteristics can be objectively known
or can be based on subjective judgments, and
the perceived risk is a real function of these
characteristics. Thus, the main research
objective is to find what C includes and what
the functional form f (·) is.
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On the basis of different contexts that
risk perception models can be applied to,
we roughly divide this topic into two sub-
categories. One focuses on perceived risk of
monetary options, such as risky investments
and gambles. The other focuses on societal
risks such as natural disasters, terrorist
attacks, and new technologies. These subcat-
egories are not mutually exclusive. However,
they do have many differences. For instance,
monetary options can be explicitly inter-
preted as gambles with numerical payoffs
and probabilities, but societal risks normally
are hard or impossible to be transformed in
that way. As a result, in the first category,
C usually contains objective values from the
option rather than subjective values from
people’s judgments, which are used in the
second one.
In the next section, we review the risk
perception studies of monetary risks. The
section titled ‘‘Perception of Societal Risks’’
mainly describes the research on societal
risks in a psychometric framework. The
section titled ‘‘Further Developments of Risk
Models’’ briefly introduces some develop-
ments of perceived risk. The last section
concludes the article and gives some possible
future research directions.
PERCEPTION OF MONETARY RISKS
Broadly speaking, monetary risks include
all options whose consequences and chances
of these consequences can be described in
a numeric form. For example, a hit and
run accident can be regarded as an event
with monetary risks (i.e., a gamble) if the
driver has a specific subjective probability
(e.g., 50%) that there are witnesses who
can recognize his/her plate number and will
report to the police. He/She knows that the
consequences should be a specific monetary
loss(e.g., $500). Monetary risks represent a
large group of events in which people focus on
themonetary consequences. In the remainder
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of this section, we basically deal with abstract
gambles. However, keep in mind that those
gambles are just parsimonious representa-
tions of many events in real life.
An Option L
(C) 
f (.) Perceived Risk
R = f (C)
Figure 1. Basic structure of perceived riskmodels.
The objective of empirical research on per-
ceived risk models is to discover and verify
C and f (·). In most studies, they are first
developed on the basis of a series of assump-
tions or axioms (see Jia et al. [1] and article
titledAxiomatic Models of Perceived Risk
for details), then they are tested by experi-
ments. There are two possible ways to test
the proposed model: (i) to test the validity of
its assumptions or (ii) to test the power of
this model using people’s holistic judgments;
either way verifies themodel. In the following
parts of this section, we do not differentiate
between the two ways to testmodels but focus
on the descriptive tests of different models.
Experiments on Models Using Moments
Just as the name implies, the moments mod-
els take C as moments of the distribution of
outcomes. These experiments were conducted
in the late 1960s–1980s. Coombs and his col-
leagues [2–5] used the moments of the distri-
bution of payoffs such as mean, variance, and
skewness to predict people’s risk perceptions.
Their work was motivated by Coombs’ portfo-
lio theory [6,7], which stated that people face
a trade-off between the expected value and
perceived risk when choosing among risky
options. For example, in one of Coombs and
Huang’s papers [2], they formulated the gam-
bles into the form of [a+ b, 50%; b− a]c (i.e., a
gamble gives you a 50% chance to win ‘‘a + b’’
and a 50% chance to win ‘‘b − a,’’ and this
gamble will be repeated ‘‘c’’ times), which
has a mean factor ‘‘b,’’ a dispersion factor
‘‘a’’ and a repeat time factor ‘‘c.’’ Varying the
value of ‘‘a,’’ ‘‘b,’’ and ‘‘c,’’ they asked sub-
jects to rank the perceived risk of several
sets of gambles. Their data supported the
moments model. However, later Barron [8]
found contrary results in his experiments.
From a more rigorous modeling approach,
Pollatsek and Tversky [9] and Rotar and
Sholomitsky [10] provided an axiomatic sys-
tem that supported their risk theory. Their
axioms were also tested by experiments [3,4].
Generally speaking, the moments models are
not totally successful as descriptive models
since the empirical tests give mixed results.
However, using distributional variables to
predict people’s perception could be suitable
in the sense that it is very intuitive. Believ-
ing that, Lopes [11] used complex gambles
(i.e., gambles withmore than three outcomes)
as stimuli to test distributional models and
stated that ‘‘the data support the distribu-
tional model of risk . . ., and they show that
people’s judgments of possible risks are sim-
ilar functionally to judgments of distribu-
tional inequality.’’
Luce’s Assumptions and Related Experimental
Results
Luce [12,13] made assumptions to define sev-
eral alternative measures of perceived risk.
Please refer to Refs 12–16 and the arti-
cle titled Axiomatic Models of Perceived
Risk in this encyclopedia for the details of
the derived measurements and their exten-
sions. Here we only describe the two key
assumptions. Specifically, the first assump-
tion claimed that if all outcomes of a gam-
ble are multiplied by a constant number,
the risk either increases additively or mul-
tiplicatively. The second assumption claimed
that there might be two ways to transfer
the random variable (i.e., a gamble) into
a single number (i.e., the perceived risk):
(i) to aggregate some transformation of the
random variable or (ii) to aggregate some
transformation of the density function of the
random variable. Notably, this is different
from the moments models since it derives
measures of risk by assuming some specific
characteristics of people’s risk judgments.
Luce’s work [12,13] only provided several
possible models. Then, there were several
studies testing both the assumptions and
people’s holistic judgments of his model. For
example, Keller et al. [14] empirically tested
the axioms proposed by Luce. In their study,
they asked subjects to rank or directly com-
pare several groups of well-defined gambles.
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They observed ‘‘remarkable consistency in
the risk judgments of the US and German
subjects.’’ They also found many other inter-
esting results: first, adding a positive number
to all payoffs decreased the risk of the gam-
ble; second, when the probability of loss was
high, it had relatively more influence on
people’s risk perception, whereas when the
probability of loss was low, the amount of
loss had more influence; third, the skewed
gambles were more risky than correspond-
ing symmetric gambles. Almost at the same
time, Weber [17] tested the validity of Luce’s
assumptions and got the result that two-
thirds of the data supports the additivity
assumption. On the basis of empirical results
[17,18], Luce and Weber [15] axiomatized a
risk perceptionmodel called conjoint expected
risk (CER), which states that the perceived
risk of a gamble is a weighted function of
five dimensions: probability of gain, probabil-
ity of loss, probability of status quo, expected
values of gain and loss. Weber [18] ran sev-
eral experiments testing the holistic validity
of the CER model and found that (i) the
CER model could predict people’s risk per-
ception for risky gambles relatively well and
(ii) the CER model was not very powerful
to deal with two-outcome gambles. Later,
Weber and Bottom [19] empirically tested the
adequacy of the axioms of the CER model,
and found support for transitivity (if A is
more risky than B, and B is more risky than
C, then A is more risky than C) and mono-
tonicity (if A is more risky than B, then for
any C,p · A+ (1 − p) · C is more risky than
p · B+ (1 − p) · C). In addition, they found
that the conjoint structure had more power
on gambles with negative outcomes than on
gambles with positive outcomes.
Two-Attribute Models for Perceived Risk
Bydecomposing a lottery (X) into itsmean (X)
and its standard risk (X ′ = X − X), Jia et al.
[1,20] (see also article titledAxiomaticMod-
els of Perceived Risk in this encyclopedia)
used a two-attribute model to represent peo-
ple’s preference such as value and risk. The
model was based on expected utility theory
[21]. Since the general form of this model is
very flexible, by varying the functional forms
of each part, this two-attribute model may be
transformed into many existing models such
as Pollatsek and Tversky’s risk model [9]
and Bell’s disappointment model [22]. It also
included possible different effects between
positive payoffs and negative payoffs, which
were emphasized in prospect theory [23]. For
a detailed description, please refer to the arti-
cle titled Axiomatic Models of Perceived
Risk in this encyclopedia. The fundamen-
tal assumptions (axioms) of this model were
also tested, and ‘‘the data indicate that the
participants’ responses were generally con-
sistent with the key assumptions of risk-
value models’’ [24].
In this section, we reviewed several stud-
ies on perceived risk of financial gambles.
As mentioned earlier, this type of gamble is
an abstract representation of a large group
of real-life events. Thus, they are important
contributions to behavioral decision research
as well as public policy making. Though so
far no functional form f (·) has been proved to
be universally valid even in very simple situ-
ations, researchers did find several patterns
that are generally consistent among groups.
They are (also see Axiomatic Models of
Perceived Risk):
1. When the variability (range, variance)
of gambles increases, the perceived risk
increases [2,25].
2. When the expected loss increases, the
perceived risk increases [2,25].
3. When a constant amount is subtracted
from the positive outcome, the per-
ceived risk increases [14].
4. When all outcomes of a zero-mean lot-
tery are multiplied by a positive num-
ber, the perceived risk increases [26].
5. When a zero-mean gamble is repeated
many times, the perceived risk
increases [26].
6. A gamble repeated fewer times with a
high expected loss is more risky than a
gamble repeatedmore times with lower
expected loss [25].
We believe it is unlikely that a mathe-
matically simple form can capture all aspects
of perceived risk in realistic situations, but
we do believe that every step further in the
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research on perceived risk will shed some
light on how people really make decisions
and what kind of information or framing
can lead people to better decisions under
risk.
PERCEPTION OF SOCIETAL RISKS
Is taking a flight more risky than driving a
car? Is nuclear power more risky than smok-
ing? Probably most people will say yes in both
cases. However, in terms of the monetary
risks that we introduced in the last section,
their answers are wrong, since there is no
evidence that the latter ones have lower prob-
abilities of losses or lower potential losses to
the human beings. But why do people think
in that way and are they right? As we said at
the beginning of this article, people have dif-
ferent interpretations of risks [27]. Experts
normally define the risk of a certain event
by its consequences (e.g., annual fatalities)
and the probability of those consequences.
A lay person’s judgment of perceived risk is
related to additional characteristics of that
event. Thus, when we try to predict the gen-
eral public’s perception and response to some
risky events, especially those events with
rare and delayed consequences, the tools we
used in monetary risks do not suffice. We
need to employ broader factors that relate to
people’s risk judgments. In this section, we
focus on a special type of risks, which are
sometimes hard to convert to pure numeric
presentations. They are defined as societal
risks.
Consider Fig. 1 again. People’s perception
of any kind of risk should come from the char-
acteristics of this risk (C). It can be objective
or subjective. In the domain of financial risks,
we use objective values to describe people’s
risk perception. However, in the domain
of societal risks, we use both objective
and subjective characteristics. Slovic et al.
[27–29] developed a psychometric paradigm
for societal risks that can be used to under-
stand different risks in a multidimensional
manner. They used psychological scaling
and multivariate analysis methods to give
a quantitative representation to risks. The
dimensions vary among different studies. For
example, in Ref. 28, the authors employed
nine dimensions such as voluntariness,
immediacy of effect, known to exposed,
known to science, controllability, newness,
chronic-catastrophic, dread-common, and
severity of consequences. The explanations
of these terms [28, p. 133] are as follows:
‘‘(i) Voluntariness: Do people get into these
situations voluntarily? (ii) Immediacy of
effect: To what extent is the risk of death
immediate—or is death likely to occur at
some later time? (iii) Known to exposed: To
what extent are the risks known precisely by
the persons who are exposed to those risks?
(iv) Known to science: To what extent are the
risks known to science? (v) Controllability: If
a person is exposed to the risk of each activity
or technology, to what extent can he/she, by
personal skill or diligence, avoid death while
engaging in the activity? (vi) Newness: Are
these risks new, novel ones or old, familiar
ones? (vii) Chronic-catastrophic: Is this a
risk that kills people one at a time, or a risk
that kills large numbers of people at once?
(viii) Dread-common: Is this a risk that peo-
ple have learned to live with and can think
about reasonably calmly, or is it one that
people have great dread for—on the level of
a gut reaction? (ix) Severity of consequences:
When the risk from the activity is realized
in the form of a mishap or illness, how likely
is it that the consequence will be fatal?’’ On
these nine scales, people made judgments
about their current perceived level of each
dimension, which helped researchers to
further analyze different risks with respect
to their characteristics. In their study, they
also found that these factors were not inde-
pendent. Peters and Slovic [30] found that
all the above dimensions could be distilled
into two primary factors: dread and risk
of unknown, which explained above 90% of
the variance.
Numerous studies have been conducted
using the psychometric paradigm. For
example, Feng et al. [31] examined patterns
of risk perceptions and decisions when
people are facing consumer product-caused
quality risks. They focused on the contexts of
contaminated pet food and lead-painted toys.
They evaluated these two risks and posi-
tioned them into a two-factor space diagram
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Figure 2. Location of two risks within the two-factor space. (From Feng et al. [31], with authors’
permission).
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(as shown in Fig. 2) of various societal risks.
Comparing with other risks, they found
that these two risks were similar in the
sense that they were very closely positioned
in the diagram. As stated in Ref. 27, the
locations of risks in the two-factor space
can largely predict people’s attitudes toward
the risks and also can help government and
authorities to deliver the right information
in the sense that it can help the general
public estimate the risks correctly.
FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS OF RISK MODELS
Risk-As-Feelings Hypothesis
If we compare the studies in the last two
sections, we notice a fundamental difference.
The first group of studies tried to use objec-
tive factors of risks to evaluate the perceived
risk. In other words, these models judged
the risk based on an individual’s anticipated
monetary outcomes. For example, consider
a lottery that gives a person a 50% chance
to win $100 and a 50% chance to lose $85.
The perceived risk of this lottery, in the
first group of models, basically comes from
the projections of loss and gain and their
chances to occur. However, in the psychome-
tric models, researchers used different psy-
chological dimensions to predict a person’s
perceived risk. They include not only antici-
pated outcomes after their decisions but also
feelings before they make decisions. In a
highly cited paper, Loewenstein et al. [32]
proposed a risk-as-feelings hypothesis and
defined the former consideration as antici-
pated emotions and the latter consideration
as anticipatory emotions. The risk-as-feelings
hypothesis emphasizes the role of the psy-
chological affect experienced at the moment
of the decision making, shows that the emo-
tional reactions and the cognitive judgments
are often different and also states that, when
emotional reactions and cognitive reactions
conflict, the emotional side normally drives
an individual’s behavior. In their article, they
also showed several determinants that could
change people’s emotional responses, such as
mental vividness, time interval, and evolu-
tionary makeup. The risk-as-feelings hypoth-
esis has been used in various fields including
decision theory, psychology, and marketing.
For example, Weber [33] employed the risk-
as-feelings hypothesis to explain why global
warming does not scare people. She explained
that the affect played an important role in
risk perception and people would take action
only if they had a vivid personal experience.
However, since global warming is not a very
salient event, and involves a great temporal
distance, people tend to underestimate the
risk associated with it.
A Hybrid Model
Holtgrave andWeber [34] compared twomod-
els of risk perception: the CER model and the
psychometricmodel. They used both financial
and health risk stimuli, and the CER model
provided a better fit if both models were
used separately. However, when combining
the two models together, they found that the
hybrid model could obtain the best fit.
Other than comparing the power between
the two models, this research also demon-
strates the relationship between them. It
proves that Slovic’s psychometric model still
has an explanatory power even after control-
ling for the effect of probability and outcomes.
In addition, this can be regarded as being in
favor of the risk-as-feelings hypothesis.
Cross-Cultural Study of Perceived Risk
The previously described studies focus on
constructing a generic model of human risk
perception. However, how people perceive
risks is not necessarily the same across
cultures. If different cultures have different
perceptions of the same risk, knowing the
difference can help them when there are
conflicts between them [35]. For example,
a Chinese company and an American com-
pany may be both better off if they can
reach a settlement that both parties find
less risky and in which both get higher
payoffs.
Weber and Hsee [35,36] investigated
subjects from China, United States, Ger-
many, and Poland by asking them to give
both the buying prices and perceived risk of
risky financial lotteries. They found that the
Chinese participants were more risk-seeking
than American participants in a traditional
DESCRIPTIVE MODELS OF PERCEIVED RISK 7
expected utility framework. However, after
some further analysis, they found that the
difference came from the cross-cultural
difference in risk perception. That is, the
Chinese subjects and American subjects
are similarly risk-averse but their risk
perceptions of the same lottery are different.
Furthermore, Weber et al. [37] compared
the American and Chinese proverbs of risk
and risk-taking to give concrete proof of the
cultural explanation of the different risk
perceptions. Their result is consistent with
the conclusion of the cushion hypothesis in
Ref. 35: the collectivist Chinese culture gives
each individual more of a cushion against
financial risks since collectivism usually
cushions in-group people to face financial
risks and deal with the possible negative
outcomes together.
Different cultures also teach people to
select different risks for attention. Douglas
and Wildavsky [38] divided cultures into
five types such as hierarchical, individualist,
egalitarian, fatalist, and hermitic. In each
culture, people selectively attend to some
specific categories of risks and choose to
ignore others. In this way, the perceived risk
of an event will vary across different types of
cultures.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
For more than 40 years, researchers of
operations research/management science,
economics, and psychology have paid much
attention to perceived risk. In this article,
we have only reviewed part of the liter-
ature. Generally speaking, in our article,
the research can be categorized into two
parts.
The first part focuses on monetary risks
or any risks whose information can be dis-
tilled into payoffs and their probabilities.
The objective is to find a parsimonious func-
tional form to describe and predict people’s
perceived risk of simple gambles. However,
human perception is a complex process and
normally is hard to describe in a simple and
good way. As a result, there is still a long way
to go. Thus, several directions still need to be
developed further: (i) a parsimonious way to
model people’s risk perception; (ii) risk per-
ception and decision making under risk are
two well-developed research areas, but little
work tries to link them together, so it would
be interesting to consider how to incorporate
perceived risk models into decision making
under risk; and (iii) risk perception with a
time dimension.
The second part focuses on psychological
research of societal risks such as Slovic’s
psychometric models. The objective is to
find a way to decompose people’s processes
for perception of risks. By analyzing an
individual’s feelings about risks in many
dimensions, researchers can categorize risks
and find appropriate ways to handle risks
accordingly. We believe several directions
need more investigation: (i) connecting soci-
etal risk research with risk communication
research to find more effective ways of risk
communication; (ii) development of a direct
connection between locations of risks in
the two-factor space and public policies;
(iii) a way to help the general public per-
ceive risks correctly; and (iv) investigating
antecedents and consequences of societal
risks.
Perceived risk research is a fruitful area.
This article has only reviewed part of this
work. Specifically, we have only focused on
the empirical studies. For those who want to
know more about the axiomatic research on
perceived risk, please refer to the literature
review part of Ref. 1 and the article titled
Axiomatic Models of Perceived Risk in
this encyclopedia.
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